As last year I prepared some web challenges designed in this years topic “space”. The challenge AALabs was about a website of a Asteroid Analysis Laboratory where you could create an account and upload asteroid meta data files for analysis. As a result a graph was shown to the user that summerized the amount of different material detected in that asteroid.
The challenge text was:
You have stolen the administrators password hashes from AALabs – a profitable technology center in outer space. However you were not able to crack them yet. Can you find out the salt?
Similar to last years web challenge you had to use different techniques to get the salt. At first you had to create an account with a unique username, your password and several other info about yourself. The AALabs webapp then internally created the new directory /home/files/username/ to later upload your files to a unique directory. Also the webapp added the user to the database for authentication and file authorization.
After registration you could login and upload your asteroid meta files. Once successfully uploaded, your file was listed in the analysis table with the option to delete the file and to create an analysis report.
Here one could find a SQL injection. By uploading a file named foo‘bar the following SQL error was triggered when creating a report:
Query failed: UPDATE metafiles SET reportfile = ‘/home/files/username/foo‘bar.report’ WHERE id = 7 AND userid = 3
Obviously the file name was escaped correctly when INSERTed into the table of uploaded files. However when creating a report and saving the new report file name (that includes the original file name) the name was not escaped correctly and the error was triggered during the UPDATE statement.
The trick here was to closely look at this error message before trying to exploit the SQL injection. It reveals the behavior that has been described above: the webapp operates with a directory that includes your username. Since it generates your report files in /home/files/username/ with your uploaded file name and the appended .report extension, it is very likely that it also uploads your file to the same directory /home/files/username/. That is safe at the first glance because the directory /home/files/ can not be accessed via webserver and many teams continued to investigate the SQL injection. However the SQL injection itself was a dead end because important characters like parenthesis were filtered. The SQL injection was actually a Information Leakage.
The trick was to register a new account with a Path Traversal in your username such as ../../var/www/Reiners. Doing so forces the webapp to upload your files into the webdirectory /var/www/ and your subdirectory Reiners/. After that you could simply upload your PHP shell to the webdirectory and access it by browser. Since the safe_mode was enabled (we will come back to that later in part 2) you had to use file functions for further investigation, for example:
<?php // Listing all files in a directory: print_r(scandir('/var/www/')); // read the configuration file that includes the salt: echo file_get_contents('/var/www/config.php'); ?>
The salt and the solution for this first part of the challenge was:
I omitted the task to use the salt and a given hash to crack the password because I felt this was boring, however it would have added just another technique required to get to the goal. So far for the first task that was worth 200 points. A second task was waiting for the teams that was worth another 300 points and that required to exploit PHP itself and bypass the safe_mode:
Now that you gained access to AALabs it is time to do some further digging to get into their system. However they seem to have a pretty safe configuration running on their webserver. Can you get around it and read the Flag?
A writeup will follow for this task. Unfortunetely only one team (props to bobsleigh) managed to solve the first task. I don’t think that the first task was too hard, however there were two distractions. First of all the SQL error was mostly pointing the teams to a SQL injection filter evasion challenge rather than a simple information leakage. Secondly the path traversal had to exactly point to the webdirectory because the www-data user had only write access to /home/files/ and to /var/www/. I can imagine that some teams tried to traverse only one directory up to see if path traversal is possible but stopped trying after not successfully writing to /home/.
Anyway I hope some teams enjoyed the challenge🙂